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"He who desires peace should prepare for war."
- Vergetius, 4th century, C.E.
"He should, however, also plan for peace."
Seev Hirsch'
INTRODUCTION
With comprehensive peace negotiations continuing in the Middle
East,2 many observers predict a new era of increasing economic cooper-
ation between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 3 In part, this forecast re-
flects the philosophy that direct economic interaction is a necessary
criterion to sustain peace between the Arabs and Israelis.4 For example,
Israel is not likely to initial any peace agreement with Syria if such
agreement lacks provisions for trade and other economic transactions. 5
1. Seev Hirsch, Trade Regimes in the Middle East, in ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 282 (Gideon Fishelson ed., 1989).
2. As of January 1, 1997, several significant peace agreements have been signed between
Israel and the Arabs. See Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State
of Israel, Mar. 26, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 362; Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Oct. 26, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 43; Israel-Palestine Liberation
Organization: Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525; Statement by the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf
on the Cancellation by the GCC of the Secondary/Tertiary Arab Boycott of Israel, Oct. 1,
1994, Israel Information Service Gopher (visited May 12, 1997) <gopher://israel-
in/fo.gov.il:70/00/mad/pce/941001.pce> [hereinafter Israel Information Service Gopher].
Of course, several major political issues have yet to be resolved, including the Israel-
Syria and Israel-Lebanon peace processes, the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian water rights,
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and other issues.
3. See Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 11, 1995) (statement of Neal M. Sher,
Executive Director of American Israel Public Affairs Comm.) available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Sher Testimony]. See also SHIMON PERES, THE NEW
MIDDLE EAST (1993); Xia Haitao & Huang Xingwei, Mideast in 1995: Peace-Making Leads
to Economic Cooperation, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; Derek Brown, Israel and Qatar Conclude £L1.2bn Natural Gas Deal,
THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 1995, at 21; Peres: There's No More Reason For War, THE
JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 4, 1996, at 2.
4. See Protocol on Economic Relations Between the Government of the State of Israel
and the P.L.O. Representing the Palestinian People, May 1, 1994, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. 696. See
also Avraham Azrieli, Improving Arbitration Under the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement: A
Framework For A Middle-East Free Trade Zone, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 187, 190-91 (1993);
Daniel Lubetzky, Incentives for Peace and Profits: Federal Legislation to Encourage U.S.
Enterprises to Invest in Arab-Israeli Joint Ventures, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 405, 409-10 (1994)
(discusses the use of economics to advance peace).
5. See Mounir B. Abboud, An Open Mid-East Market Will Grant Israel a Central Role,
SAUDI GAZETTE, Mar. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. However,
most Middle East analysts contend that a final settlement of the remaining political issues
between the Arabs and Israelis must precede any discussion of future economic relations. For
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Many analysts and politicians have been considering the concept of
a Middle East regional trade association as a significant component of
the economic relations that will be necessary to sustain peaceful rela-
tions in the region.6 These analysts and politicians recognize the impor-
tance of liberalized trade and integrated markets to establish and pre-
serve peace in the region, as well as to maximize allocative efficiencies
for the region's productive resources. In turn, these observers predict
that the mutual benefits of trade and expanding interdependence will
create "vested interests" to maintain peaceful and cooperative relations.7
Of course, it would be nearly impossible to predict the exact form of
this increasing economic interaction. The possibilities could range from
complete economic integration involving zero trade barriers to more
limited forms of economic interaction. Nevertheless, whatever trade
regime is ultimately established, it must comply with the World Trade
Organization's (WTO) rules governing international trade, at least to the
extent that those Middle East nations are signatories to that treaty.8 Thus,
example, Seev Hirsch claims that "it can be rightly argued that it is the nature of the political
settlement which will provide the framework for economic relations and not the other way
around." Hirsch, supra note 1, at 269.
6. See id See also PERES, supra note 3; King Hussein Ibn Talal of Jordan, Address at
the Opening Ceremony of UNESCO's International Symposium on the Future of the Mediter-
ranean After the Peace Process (1995), in Jordan's King Husayn Calls for Regional Bodies to
Achieve Security and Free Trade, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 21, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Azrieli, supra note 4, at 191 (expressing
hope for a "Middle East Economic Community").
7. See Lubetzky, supra note 4, at 409. The idea that economic interdependence is a
significant factor in preventing war is a popular theory among liberal perspectives of interna-
tional political economy. See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 31 (1987); Mounir B. Abboud, Arabs Still Looking for Common Ground, SAUDI
GAZETTE, Aug. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. See generally
RUTH ARAD ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF PEACEMAKING (1983).
8. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, April 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol.
1 (1994), 33 I.L.M 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO]. The WTO annex IA includes a document
labelled "GATT 1994" which is essentially an updated version of the 1947 GATT. Hereinafter,
[all GATT citations are to GATT 1994, as amended].
On January 1, 1995, the WTO succeeded the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
(General Agreement, or GATI') as the principal legal institution of the multilateral trading
system. The WTO's rules cover most aspects of world trade in goods and services, and the
WTO is also the primary international forum for negotiating and settling disputes on all trade
matters. The WTO attempts to liberalize international trade by enforcing international
contractual obligations that define how nations may implement their domestic trade legislation.
See WTO World Wide Web Home Page, (visited Feb. 14, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/
wto/about.wpf.html> [hereinafter WTO Web Page].
As of May 16, 1997, 131 nations are members of the WTO and an additional 29 nations
have applied for admission. Id at <http://www.wto.org/wto.memtab2.wpf.html>. WTO
member countries account for 90-95% of world trade. See id at <http://www.wto.org>. As of
March 15, 1997, Middle East WTO Members include Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco,
Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. Countries being reviewed by WTO accession working parties
include Algeria, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Id. at <http://www.wto.org/
wto.memtab2Lwpf.html>.
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an important issue emerges: how should Middle East nations structure
their future economic relationships to secure their peaceful reconciliation
while simultaneously fulfilling their WTO obligations?
This note suggests two solutions to this quandary. First, the newly
emerging bloc of peace-declaring nations in the Middle East should
consider establishing a regional free trade area. However, instead of
reducing the tariffs of "substantially all" of the region's products as
would normally be required by Article XXIV of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 9-the authoritative provision regulating
free trade areas-this note argues that a Middle East free trade area
should reduce trade barriers only for certain economic sectors, such as
textiles and chemicals. Such a scheme will be termed a "sectoral trade
area," or "STA." Second, and in furtherance of the STA scheme, this
note argues that Article XXIV does not adequately facilitate peaceful
political and economic relations between formerly belligerent and lesser-
developed nations that have low levels of economic interaction. Accord-
ingly, Article XXIV should be amended to allow STAs as described
above under narrowly defined and closely monitored situations.
This note discusses these two propositions in depth. Part I briefly
discusses the current political and economic developments in the Middle
East that lead the parties toward greater economic interaction. Part II
illustrates how the Middle East region would benefit by establishing a
formal regional trade area. Part III analyzes the legal constraints imposed
upon regional trade associations by GATT Article XXIV and explains
how such rules impair not only the Middle East peace process in particu-
lar but also international economic interests in general. Part IV surveys
the various models for economic integration in the Middle East currently
discussed by academics and policymakers and demonstrates why sectoral
trade liberalization offers the most benefits on balance. Finally, Part V
provides the policy justification for amending GATT Article XXIV to
allow sectoral preferences in regional trade areas.
Some Middle East countries are GATT signatories but not WTO members. These include
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen. Edmund O'Sullivan, The Middle East Plays the GATT
Game, MIDDLE EAST Bus. WKLY., Apr. 22, 1994, at 4. Former GAT members do not have
an automatic right to join the WTO. A two-thirds majority of WTO members is needed to
approve the terms of a country's accession to the WTO. WTO art. XXI para. 2.
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] art. XXIV, para. 8.
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I. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The momentum towards increased economic and political integration
in the Middle East has been deemed "irreversible."10 The region's politi-
cal leaders have stated that they are committed to the peace process,"
and more specifically to the broad concept of a Middle East free trade
zone.' Moreover, the recent peace agreements between Israel, Jordan,
Egypt, and the newly formed Palestinian entity provide the political and
legal foundation for widespread economic development in the Middle
East.13
Several contemporary sociopolitical and economic events explain the
Arab and Israeli interest in developing closer economic relations. Among
these include the collapse of the Soviet Union, 4 the 1992 Israeli Labor
Party victory, the volatility of oil prices,15 the inadequate Arab infrastruc-
ture to manage high population growth 6 and the poor record of Arab
development programs in improving their agricultural, industrial, and
financial sectors. 7
10. See The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
Sept. 28, 1995, pmbl., Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gopher (visited May 12, 1997),
<http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/peace/interim.html>. See also Special State Department Briefing
by Dennis Ross, Special Middle East Coordinator, FED'L NEWS SERV., Jan. 17, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; David Lamb, Arabs See There's No Turning Back Now,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at Al; Glenn Frankel, Netanyahu Reaffirms Dedication to Peace:
New Israeli Leader Sets the Stage for Trip to Washington, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 5, 1996.
11. See John Lancaster, Middle East Summit Opens; Economic Conference Aims to Turn
Peace into Regional Prosperity, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1994, at A15. See also Foreign Minister
Shimon Peres, Remarks to the Jerusalem International Business Conference (Oct. 31, 1993),
Israel Information Service Gopher, supra note 2 at <gopher://israel-in-
fo.gov.il:70/00/mad/pce/pce.1>.
12. See MEED Conference, MEED Conference: The Economics of the Middle East Peace
Conference, MEED MIDDLE EAST Bus. WKLY., Jan. 21, 1994, at 5, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File; Diana Abdallah, Arabs Urged to Create Economic Bloc, REUTER EUR.
Bus. REP., Jan. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Arab Free Trade
Talks Open in Egypt, U.P.I., Sept. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File;
GCC Agrees On New Moves Towards Common Market, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Dec. 7, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
13. See Sher Testimony, supra note 3.
14. When History Passes By, THE ECONOMIST, Arab Survey, May 12, 1990, at 3.
15. Oil to the Rescue?, THE ECONOMIST, Arab Survey, May 12, 1990, at 17.
16. Pop, THE ECONOMIST, Arab Survey, May 12, 1990, at 4; Edmund O'Sullivan, New
Era for Middle East Economies, MEED MIDDLE EAST Bus. WKLY., Jan. 6, 1995, at 2
[hereinafter O'Sullivan, New Era].
17. See THE PROBLEMS OF ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 177-99
(Adda Guecioueur ed., 1984).
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Increased Israeli and Arab cooperation is manifest in numerous
agreements that address diverse economic areas. Such agreements cover
private sector development; 8 water;9 energy;' establishing a Regional
Bank for the Development of the Middle East;21 and Industrial Parks.22
These developments also coincide with economic liberalization programs
in several Arab Middle Eastern countries.23
The potential of the Middle East to be a lucrative market makes a
stable economic environment a worthwhile goal,' and is attributable to
18. See Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit, Oct. 30-Nov. 1, 1994, Casablanca
Declaration, Israel Information Service Gopher, supra note 2, at <gopher://israel-in-
fo.gov.il:70/00/mad/pce/941 1O1.pce>; Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Israel, Palestinians Set Up Panel
To Spur Economic, Political Cooperation, BNA INT'L TRADE REP., Oct. 4, 1995, at 1663. See
also David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine: An Analysis of the Law on the
Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 529 (1995) (analyzing the
Law on the Encouragement of Investment adopted by the Palestinian National Authority in
April, 1995).
19. See Multilateral Working Group on Water Decides on Regional Projects, June 23,
1995, Israel Information Service Gopher, supra note 2, at <gopher://israel-info.gov.ii:
70/00/mad/multi/950623.mul>.
20. See Arabs and Israel: Iran and Pipelines, THE FIN. TIMES LTD. ENERGY ECONOMIST,
Jan. 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
21. See Middle East Regional Development Bank, Jan. 10, 1995, Israel Information
Service Gopher, supra note 2 at <gopher:llisrael-info.gov.il:70/00/madlpce950110.pce>.
Although, the chance for this to occur appears to be remote after several Gulf countries refused
to finance the bank, stating that such a move was "premature until Israel troops leave occupied
Arab lands in the West Bank, Gaza, Syria and Lebanon." Youssef M. Ibrahim, Arab States
Rule Out Regional Bank, INT'L HERALD TRIn., Feb. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File. The United States insists that the idea will still be pursued. Id.
22. See Peres-Major Meeting-Industrial Parks, Regional Bank, Mar. 13, 1995, Israel
Information Service Gopher, supra note 2 at <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/madlpce
950313.pce>.
23. See New Era Dawns for Markets on the Move, MEED MIDDLE EAST Bus. WKLY.,
Apr. 14, 1995, at S2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Paul Lewis, A Hard-
Liner's Ballot Victory Doesn't Panic Israeli Markets, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1996, at DI; Sarni
Aboudi, Palestinians Take the Plunge: Stock Exchange Planned for Nablus in Effort to Attract
Capital, WASH. POST, July 21, 1996, at H2.
24. Economists have attempted to quantify the potential for growth and development
under conditions of peace in the Middle East. For example, in 1989, Professor Haim Ben-
Shahar estimated that:
[w]ithin ten years of peace, the GNP of Israel could be about 22 percent higher than
in the absence of peace. Had the peace process begun in 1982 with accelerated
economic growth accompanying it, by 1992 Israel's GNP could have been $4.8
billion larger than is forecast with the continuation of existing conditions. Similar
developments could have taken place in the Arab states bordering upon Israel:
Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Had peaceful relations been established in 1982,
the total GNP of these four countries could have been 24 percent, or $20 billion,
higher after ten years. The standard of living and per capita consumption, and of
course, levels of investment would also have risen by similar percentages.
Haim Ben-Shahar, Introduction, Economic Cooperation In the Middle East: From Dream to
Reality, in ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 5.
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several elements. First, a "peace dividend" might be derived from a
substantial decrease in defense expenditures and the ensuing release of
those resources for productive employment.2 Second, foreign direct
investment will likely increase,, thereby reducing the cost of. capital.
Third, the ensuing development of intraregional trade would increase
specialization and trade based upon comparative advantage, creating
additional sources of employment and investment opportunities, and
stimulating economic growth as the region uses its resources more effi-
ciently. Finally, cooperation in joint economic projects, particularly in the
improvement of the region's water and transportation infrastructure
would provide the necessary foundations for sustainable growth. All of
these factors would improve the productivity, living standards, and
growth of the region as a whole.2
Of course, many Middle East countries will have to confront sub-
stantial structural problems before they can enjoy the benefits of peace
and economic growth. For example, economic development in the region,
especially in Arab, non oil-producing States, has stagnated for the past
several decades 27 primarily because entrenched political monopolies,
common in many Arab States, have hindered economic development. 28 In
addition, the Arab economies have been industrially and agriculturally
weak.29
The Middle East region is a potentially enormous market for private sector investment.
See Amy Dockser Marcus, In the Middle East, The Newest Rivalry Is Over Cash, Not Arms,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1995, at Al. See also Neal Sandier & Kirk Albrecht, Building Palestine
Share By Share, Bus. WK., Nov. 13, 1995, at 118E 6 (housing, hotels, and telephone net-
works); Arabs and Israel: Iran and Pipelines, supra note 20 (energy); Amy Dockser Marcus,
U.S. Banks Find New Opportunities in the Mideast, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1995, at A18
(banking); Ilene R. Prusher, Likud's Pro-Business Plan is Economic Shift for Israel, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MON., June 26, 1996, at 8 (finance and investment).
25. In Israel for example, defense consumption as a percent of GDP has ranged from a
low of 10.4% in 1966, to a high of 31.7% in 1975, and then progressively back down to
13.5% in 1989. YAKIR PLESSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ISRAEL 179 (1994). However,
security costs will surely maintain high levels regardless of peace as Israel and Syria, for
example, will undoubtedly continue to take considerable measures to ensure internal security.
26. The above analysis is suggested by Ben-Shahar, supra note 24, at 5-6.
27. SAMIR AMIN, THE ARAB ECONOMY TODAY 41-47 (1982) [hereinafter S. AMIN]. See
generally GALAL A. AMIN, THE MODERNIZATION OF POVERTY (1974) [hereinafter G. AMIN].
28. Trade policy in many Arab countries historically has been characterized by relatively
high levels of protection. Almost all the Arab countries began their independence after World
War II with extensive barriers to imports. Pressures to liberalize remained politically weak
through the 1970s as intellectuals in many Arab countries propagated the view that there was
little prospect for export-oriented development. Moreover, Arab leaders often condemned
liberalism largely for its association with colonialism. Finally, the balance-of-payments crises
that plagued attempts at accelerated economic development were often dealt with by a
combination of import and exchange controls. See ALAN RICHARDS & JOHN WATERBURY, A
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 25-28, 219-37 (1989).
29. S. AMIN, supra note 27, at 76-81.
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II. BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
While the above developments suggest reasons why the Arabs and
Israelis should increase their economic interaction, the question then
becomes in what form will this cooperation take place? This part dis-
cusses how economic integration in general takes place, describes the
various methods to integrate economically, and surveys the problems that
countries have historically faced during their attempts to form regional
trade associations.
A. Theory of Economic Integration
Economic integration involves eliminating internal trade barriers
among a group of countries while maintaining barriers against imports
from nongroup countries with the hope of improving that group's eco-
nomic position relative to the rest of the world30 Oftentimes, these trade
associations are regional in nature, and are called "regional trade agree-
ments" (RTAs). 3'
Several factors explain why nations form such trade arrangements.
First, smaller countries may seek increased security of regional market
access, thereby improving their bargaining power in multilateral trade
negotiations32 or to express frustration with the slow pace of these
multilateral trade negotiations, as occurred during the Uruguay Round.33
Second, some countries wish to "promote industries that are not viable
without a protected regional market ... the idea being that they would
be internationally competitive if given sufficient time to develop.
34
Furthermore, some nations join RTAs to secure non-economic objectives,
such as strengthening political ties, managing migration flows, or to
provide an insurance policy in case international institutions such as the
WTO fail to enforce their rules.35 Finally, of particular importance to
lesser-developed countries (LDCs) in general, and many Arab countries
in particular, a regional strategy reflects the limited success, if not the
30. NANSHI F. MATSUURA, INTERNATIONAL BusINEss 113 (1991).
31. As used in this Note, the terms "region" and "RTA" do not necessarily contemplate
geographic-proximity. Rather, they are used to describe any formal economic relationship
between two or more countries.
32. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL
168 (3d ed. 1988).
33. See Clinton Shiells, Regional Trade Blocs: Trade Creating or Diverting?, FIN. &
DEV., Mar. 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
34. Id. Although Shiells points out that RTAs following this justification "have been the
least successful in expanding trade and promoting regional growth." Id.
35. Id.
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outright failure, of prior import substitution strategies36--a reality that
compelled the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to
recommend a regional strategy for LDC development.
37
There are several sub-categories of RTAs, including sectoral trade
areas (STAs), free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions (CUs), common
markets, complete economic unions, and complete political integration.
An STA is an arrangement whereby nations negotiate tariff concessions
for specific economic sectors. An FTA eliminates tariffs and quantitative
restrictions between member-countries, but each country maintains its
own tariff rates on imports from non-member countries. A CU involves,
in addition to an FTA, the unification of tariffs against non-member
countries. A common market is a CU plus the removal of restrictions on
the movement of factors of production among member-countries. An
economic union combines national economies into a single transnational
economy, thereby adding to the common market situation the unification
of economic and social policies among the member countries. This
situation usually calls for the establishment of a supra-national decision
making body. Finally, the highest form of integration, the political union,
occurs when group of countries combine all government functions into
one sovereign decision-making entity.38
While the benefits of RTAs to member countries theoretically mirror
those of multilateral free trade,39 some scholars point out that RTAs are
inherently discriminatory to non-member countries because RTAs are
purposefully designed to provide benefits only for members of the
trading bloc4° and that these regional groupings might lead to resource
reallocations which are economically undesirable."
36. See Bassam Elias Harik, Economic Integration in Less Developed Countries: Prospects
for Six Arab Countries 91-92 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne State University).
37. GILPIN, supra note 7, at 295. See also Progressive Development of the Principles and
Norms of International Law Relating to the New International Economic Order: Analytic
Papers and Analysis of the Texts of Relevant Instruments, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1478 (1982).
38. ELIAS T. GHANTUS, ARAB INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION 18-19 (1982).
39. For example, regionalism enables a manufacturer in a member country to reach a
larger market thereby allowing that manufacturer to realize economies of scale which supports
more efficient production structures by enabling the manufacturer to spread fixed costs over
larger regional markets. Consumers will also enjoy the benefits of increased competition in the
form of lower prices and more variety and quantity of goods and services. Increased competi-
tion also generally results in more innovation and improved product quality. See GILPIN, supra
note 7, at 172-80; Ali M. EI-Agraa, General Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 1 (2d ed. 1988).
40. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GAT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANI-
ZATION 274 (1970).
41. While it is theorized that regional integration is beneficial because it might lead to a
more optimal allocation of world resources, in practice, the actual economic effects of
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B. Integration In Practice
In practice, the lower degrees of integration (STAs, FTAs and CUs)
are widespread around the globe, and the higher forms (economic and
political unions) are very rare. 42 Most countries have resisted the higher
forms of integration because they believe that this would intolerably
preferential trade agreements is unclear. See The Right Direction?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 16,
1995, at 23; Battle Lines, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1994/Jan. 6, 1995, at 13.
The debate essentially focuses on the extent that regional associations encourage member
countries to trade among themselves at the expense of outside countries. For example, in his
seminal work, Jacob Viner showed that the creation of a CU or an FTA can have two serious
effects: (a) a trade-creating effect and (b) a trade-diverting effect. JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS
UNION ISSUE 41-55 (1950). As Professor Jackson summarizes, "[tirade creation refers to the
expansion of trade with efficient suppliers inside the CU or FTA. Trade diversion refers to a
shift in trade from efficient suppliers outside the regional arrangement, to inefficient suppliers
inside it, driven by the desire to take advantage of trade preferences." JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 465 (3d ed. 1995). Viner attempted to demonstrate
how trade diversion represents a move away from the optimum resource allocation because
certain countries inside the region may be higher real-cost sources than outside countries.
Whether a FTA or CU benefits the global economy depends on whether trade creation or trade
diversion predominates.
However, Viner's analysis is incomplete, as many other factors must be considered when
assessing the merits of a CU or FA. For example, eliminating tariff barriers between
countries will change the relative prices which will shift the geographic origins of the products
traded. Thus, whether a country will be better off depends on the price and income elasticities
of demand for the products traded. In addition, the increase in the size of the markets may
create economies of scale. Finally, with regard to FTAs, the existence of trade diversion will
also depend on the rules of origin among the Member States; with regard to a CU, the rates
of the common external tariffs will also be a substantial factor whether trade diversion will
occur. In addition, according to Richard Steinberg, "... no economist has been able to
determine a priori whether trade creation or trade diversion predominates in the formation of
a regional bloc .... [Most studies] usually have been unsuccessful or expressed only as a
broad and speculative 'suspicion.' "Richard H. Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses
to Trade Diversion Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 315, 320-21 (1993).
The economic literature indicates much disagreement over the relevance of the trade
diversion concern. See Paul R. Krugman, Is Bilateralism Bad?, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
TRADE POLICY 9 (E. Helpman & A. Razia, eds., 1991) reprinted in JACKSON ET AL., supra at
465-67 (arguing that while the risk of trade diversion is a "weak point" in assessing the
benefits of regional trading arrangements, regional arrangements may try to take advantage of
their enhanced monopoly power in trade to raise their external tariffs to the optimal level);
Mohammad Sulieman Nahar Bani-Hani, Economic Integration in the Arab World: Application
of Some Economic Concepts 82-83 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California (Riverside)) (pointing out the limitations of the trade diversion analysis, particularly
that it does not account for income distribution between countries, the inevitability of trade
diversion among LDCs, and its neglect of dynamic aspects of trade creation which is more
important to the LDCs than the static concept.); JACKSON ET AL., supra, at 468-69 ("despite
the theoretical uncertainty about the consequences of preferential arrangements, empirical
economists typically argue that existing regional arrangements tend to have positive economic
effects for their members and no more than minimal adverse effects on the rest of the world.").
42. Lower degrees include NAFrA, the United States-Israel FTA, and Mercosur-a CU
among Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The EU is the only example of a higher
form of integration.
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constrain their sovereignty in carrying out their trade and development
policies. This prospect is a primary concern to many developing coun-
tries, since "their national consciousness is high and economic develop-
ment to them is a postindependence endeavor. 4 3 In most cases, devel-
oping countries choose the FTA strategy, notwithstanding their sover-
eignty reservations, because the FTA option is more palatable to LDCs
as a method to reduce trade barriers than to liberalize on a global scale."
Middle East countries have pursued varying economic and political
development strategies ranging from the autonomous or self-reliant
development approach advocated by dependency theorists (Syria, Algeria,
and Libya) to more aggressive participation in the world economy (Israel,
Egypt, and Morocco). There have been previous Arab attempts to
achieve deeper levels of regional political and economic integration. For
example, in the 1960s, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt formed the Arab
Common Market.45 In 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council' included
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and
Oman. In 1989, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Libya united
to form the Arab Maghreb Union, while Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North
Yemen created the Arab Co-operation Council. Despite these ambitious
plans for economic and political integration within these associations, "no
practical benefit has emerged from this alphabet soup" 47 especially when
compared to the European Union.
C. Costs and Benefits of Integration
The difficulties and risks of economic integration are important
considerations when nations decide whether to adopt a regional economic
43. GHANTUS, supra note 38, at 19-20.
44. As an example, Wechter claims that "Mexico would be more likely to reduce trade
barriers with the United States and Canada than with all the world's nations, as may be
inferred by its prior hesitance to join GATT." Kevin Wechter, NAFTA: A Complement to
GATT or a Setback to Global Free Trade?, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2611, 2622 (1993). Wechter
further adds that "developing countries that had no prior interest or experience in free trade
agreements will likely join an expanding trade bloc, lest they miss an opportunity that their
sister countries are enjoying." Id at 2625.
45. Recognized by GATT: Working Party Report, Apr. 6, 1966, B.I.S.D. (14th Supp.) at
20 (1966). The Arab Common Market eliminated customs duties and tariffs among its
members but a common external tariff was never established. See also Shiells, supra note 33.
46. The Gulf Cooperation Council attempted to liberalize movements of capital and labor
(in industrial and agricultural products but excluded petroleum), by establishing a common
external tariff, and negotiating with the EU about a possible economic cooperation agreement.
47. When History Passes By, supra note 14, at 3. See also G. AMIN, supra note 27, at
28-34; THE PROBLEMS OF ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, supra note 17,
at 177-98; GHANTUS, supra note 38, at 57-82; Bani-Hani, supra note 41, at 117-61; Harik,
supra note 36, at 132.
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strategy.48 Some nations are concerned that they will not be able to
compete with countries who suddenly have greater access to their market,
and that this will suppress their industrialization process. Another con-
cern is that the countries forming the organization may not be similarly
situated economically. Since many LDCs are often "more competitive
than complementary [relative to each other] ... their competitive inter-
ests make it hard for them to form a community. 4 9 Also, the possibility
that one group of nations will disproportionately benefit can be political-
ly divisive. As Gilpin argues, "[tihe very forces of economic nationalism
that prompted the initial commitment to regional cooperation have led to
its destruction as each nation has tried to advance its own national
interests."-' All of these concerns are strongly held by many Arab nations
when contemplating opening their borders to Israel.51 Nevertheless, as
Kindleberger insists, "[i]f the political difficulties can be overcome,....
there can be little doubt that industrialization in large units is better than
industrialization at the same levels of protection in five times that num-
ber."'52 Thus, it is hoped that both the Arabs and Israelis stand to gain in
absolute terms with greater economic interaction.
III. THE LAW OF GATT ARTICLE XXIV
Before speculating what a viable Middle East regional trade area
would look like, it is important to understand the WTO's rules regarding
regional associations. Specifically, GATT Article XXIV will be impli-
cated should the Middle East region wish to establish a regional trade
area or common market. This section discusses Article XXIV's rules and
analyzes some of the problems that Article XXIV has caused in its
governance of regional trade associations. Section A briefly outlines the
legal principles of the world trading regime in goods as governed by the
GATT. Section B analyzes Article XXIV's rules regarding regional trade
associations (RTAs). Finally, Section C discusses how Article XXIV is
applied to RTAs and argues that GATT's continued tolerance of legally
infirm regional associations provides a basis to question the legitimacy of
Article XXIV as an effective mechanism to regulate RTAs.
48. See Bani-Hani, supra note 41, at 99-112.
49. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 187 (5th ed. 1973).
50. GILPIN, supra note 7, at 295.
51. See infra Part IV.B.
52. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 49, at 187.
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A. Purpose of the WTO
"The basic purpose of the General Agreement is to constrain gov-
ernments from imposing or continuing a variety of measures which
restrain or distort international trade. 53 To carry out this purpose, GATT
adopts three fundamental tenets. First, trade should be conducted on a
nondiscriminatory basis as embodied in the most-favored-nation (MFN)
clause of Article 1.4 Second, Article II forbids WTO members from
assessing duties to other WTO members in excess of the established
"schedule of concessions. 55 Third, Article III obliges WTO members to
observe the "national treatment" obligation of nondiscrimination against
imports.56 This means that all WTO members must afford the same
treatment to all goods, whether produced domestically or imported.
B. The Article XXIV Exception
In order to facilitate the stated goal of increasing world trade by
encouraging the integration of national economies, 57 GATT's drafters
believed that so long as the trade association eliminated trade barriers
within the trade area, "it was viewed as a step toward free trade, partial
to be sure, but laudable nonetheless. 58 Accordingly, Article XXIV
explicitly creates an exception to the Article I MFN obligation by allow-
ing countries to establish trade associations that accord special trade
privileges to member countries, such as lower tariffs, without making
such privileges available to all other WTO members. Specifically, the
Article XXIV MFN exception applies to three types of associations: (1)
53. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 41, at 290.
54. Article I reads: "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties." GATT art. I, para. 1.
55. GATT art. II, para. I(b).
56. GAlT art. III, para. 2.
57. GATT art. XXIV, para. 4.
58. DAM, supra note 40, at 274. Incidentally, as Professors Carter and Trimble point out,
the creators of the IMF, World Bank, and other international institutions "assumed that
regional organizations might develop to supplement the efforts of the international entities. For
example, the U.N. Charter specifically assumes the active existence of regional groups
(Articles 52-54).." BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 497
(2d ed. 1995).
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a "free trade area," (FIA)59 (2) a "customs union," (CU)60 and (3) an
"interim agreement" necessary for the formation of an FTA or CU.
61
At the same time, Article XXIV contains several provisions that
attempt to mitigate the potential harm that these trade associations may
inflict on non-members by attempting to ensure trade creation and to
minimize trade diversion.62 First, paragraph 4 states that "the purpose of
a customs union or of a free trade area should be to facilitate trade be-
tween the constituent territories and not to raise trade barriers to the trade
of other contracting parties with such territories. 63 Second, paragraph 8
requires that trade barriers be eliminated on "substantially all the trade"
of the group, to prevent trade diversion in particular goods.' Thus, the
Article XXIV exception may not be used to provide merely an exchange
of preferences on a bilateral basis. Third, paragraph 5 states that external
trade barriers toward outside countries must not be higher on average
after the establishment of the FTA or CU.65 Fourth, paragraph 5(c)
requires that the plan and schedule for the formation of such CU or FTA
occur "within a reasonable length of time."'  Finally, recognizing that
these arrangements will be phased in over time, paragraph 7 requires that
the countries establish a clear plan for the transition and prompt notifica-
tion to the Contracting Parties.67
59. GAIT art. XXIV, para. 5(b) (defining an FTA as an association where each member
country maintains its own tariff schedule applying to non-members while eliminating tariffs
against imports from members).
60. GAT art. XXIV, para. 5(a) (defined as an FTA but with a common external tariff).
61. GATT art. XXIV, para. 5(c).
62. PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE 97-127 (1993). See also Understanding on the Interpre-
tation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, prmbl., reprinted
in The Results of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts
31 (GAT Secretariat 1994) [hereinafter Understanding].
63. GAT art. XXIV, para. 4.
64. GAIT art. XXIV, para. 8. A GAT working party noted that while "substantially all"
has never been defined, it clearly implies "less than all" trade. Working Party Report on the
Agreement Between the EFTA Countries and Spain, Nov. 10, 1980, B.I.S.D. (27th Supp.) at
127, 130 (1981). Clearly though, trade agreements covering only one sector of the associa-
tions' economies, such as automobiles, would not permitted.
65. Paragraph 5 states that "the duties and other regulations of commerce... in respect
of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole
be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of
commerce [previously applicable]." GATT art. XXIV, para. 5(a), (b). In an FTA, the obligation
not to increase protection against non-members is absolute.
66. A "reasonable length of time" is now defined as ten years, except in "exceptional
cases." Id. at para. 5(c).
67. GAIT art. XXIV, para. 7. However, Article XXIV does not require that the Con-
tracting Parties actually approve the RTA. In fact, out of 109 RTAs notified to the GAT
between 1948 and 1995 (one-third of those occurred between 1990-1994), only sixty-four
working parties were formed to evaluate their legality. Of those sixty-four, only six working
party conclusions (all sanctioning them) were issued. The Right Direction?, supra note 41, at
23.
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C. Economic Customs and Legal Realities
The increased use of RTAs represents a significant development of
the international trade scene. The preference of most countries to form a
regional trade association under the guise of Article XXIV,6s coupled
with GATT's members' unwillingness to prevent their formation, pro-
vides a basis to question the continued utility of Article XXIV's rules to
regulate RTAs. First, because so few RTAs have historically complied
with Article XXIV, the commitment to the multilateral liberalization
rules that the WTO so forcefully espouses has been undoubtedly weak-
ened. Second, the fact that Article XXIV's provisions have not been
adequately enforced suggests that the law itself might not realistically
serve international economic interests. The following parts will examine
these two assertions in greater detail.
1. Article XXIV is Seldom Complied With
The application of Article XXIV has been a continuous source of
contention among WTO members, as Article XXIV's rules have been
interpreted inconsistently and have been applied ineffectively. For
example, the standards of "substantially all" and "on the whole" detailed
in paragraphs 5 and 8 respectively have "proved as impossibly vague as
it sounds."'69 Indeed, no GATT working party has ever defined the "sub-
stantially all the trade" clause or, for that matter, has ever held that an
RTA failed to meet that standard. Further, because GATT working
parties have consistently abstained from either explicitly approving or
rejecting an RTA's compliance with the "substantially all" standard in
even the most "flagrant" cases, it appears as if a precedent has been
established to grant much latitude under this provision.7' Thus, it is not
surprising that few RTAs have complied with Article XXIV.71 As
68. Between 1947 and 1994, 108 regional agreements notified GATT, and between 1990
and 1994, 33 new RTAs notified GAIT. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REGIONALISM AND
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1 (1995). "When the WTO was established on January 1, 1995,
nearly all its members were parties to at least one [regional] agreement notified to GATT." Id.
These range from CUs, like the EU, to FrAs such as NAFTA, to non-reciprocal preferential
agreements like the Lom Convention. Finally, the share of intra-regional world merchandise
trade increased from 40.6% in 1958 to 50.4% in 1993, although this increase is mostly
attributable to the development of the EU. Id at 39.
69. DAM, supra note 40, at 275.
70. Wechter, supra note 44, at 2617.
71. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 41, at 470. See also DAM, supra note 40, at 275. For
example, with regard to the New Zealand/Australia FTA, the countries did not set out a plan
and schedule of their FTA and the agreement "covered only about 50 percent of current trade
between the two countries, and of that 50 percent about 90 percent was already on the free list.
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Professor Jackson states, "the preference system has been tolerated, either
by an explicit GATT waiver ... or merely by inaction"'72 and that
"[li]egal arguments have often been ignored or resulted in a standoff
without resolution.
73
Professor Dam offers two reasons for this practice of non-enforce-
ment: (1) imprecise and ambiguous standards of application, and (2)
underlying principles that make little economic sense. 74 Indeed, despite
attempts to draft precise legal language in paragraphs 4 through 10 of
Article XXIV, "[a]mbiguity rather than precision [has] reigned."' 75 Dam
points out that the regional agreements that preceded GATT did not
comply with Article XXIV, and in the face of the conflict, "the GATT
and not the regional groupings yielded., 76 Later trade associations
reviewed by GATT working parties could likely be considered as out-
right preferential arrangements but were nevertheless defended as being
close enough to Article XXIV's strictures which made it politically
difficult for GATT working parties to treat them as violations of MFN.77
Moreover, GATT working parties have historically tolerated RTAs
notwithstanding their non-compliance because the GATT itself probably
"would have been destroyed" had an attempt been made to prevent the
formation of the European Economic Community in the 1950s and 60s
on the ground that GATT had not been complied with.
78
There was an attempt during the Uruguay Round to strengthen
Article XXIV by minimizing the potential trade diversion; unfortunately,
this will most likely not ensure greater discipline or enforcememt by
WTO members. Specifically, the 1994 Understanding on Article XXIV
introduced greater precision to (1) measure changes in levels of
The agreement thus involved commitments to eliminate existing restriction on only about 5
percent of total intermember trade." Id. at 283. See also Wechter, supra note 44, at 2616. A
GATI Working Party report tolerated that agreement notwithstanding its legal infirmities by
stating that it appreciated the difficulties for the two governments to agree immediately on a
plan and schedule. Working Party Report on the New Zealand/Australia Free-Trade Agree-
ment, Apr. 5, 1966, GATT B.I.S.D. (14th Supp.) at 115.
72. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 41, at 470.
73. L




78. Id. at 291. Dam also concedes, however, that even though "the GATT has rarely been
successful in forcing regional arrangements entirely into the Article XXIV mold is not to say
that it has not had considerable influence at the margin. On the contrary, there is evidence, for
example, that the GATT criteria were significant factors in the drafting of the Latin American
Free-Trade Association treaty." Id.
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protection after the formation of a RTA, 9 (2) establish timetables for
completion of the integration process," (3) oblige CU members to
compensate non-members for any changes in bound levels of
protection,"' and (4) provide working party review of CUs and FTAs.82
However, this note is skeptical that these changes will significantly
improve the way Article XXIV is enforced. After all, enforcing Article
XXIV would be self-defeating for many WTO members since a large
number of WTO members themselves are members of "illegal" RTAs.
As one commentator argues, for these countries to criticize a future
proposed RTA under the authority of the Understanding would certainly
"be hypocritical, and perhaps self-incriminating."8 3 Other economists
share this cynicism: "asking [WTO members to adhere to the
Understanding] is like asking criminals to decide on their own
sentencing.""
Perhaps the only tangible benefit of the Understanding, however, is
its attempt to resolve the issue whether the compatibility of an Article
XXIV arrangement could be raised in dispute settlement proceedings.8 5
Professor Jackson predicts that future dispute panel reports might refer to
working party reports that comment on Article XXIV violations.8 6
2. Article XXIV Does Not Adequately Serve
International Economic Interests
As Dam and others assert, the "highly ambitious" rules of Article
XXIV do not reflect economic or political reality. Dam claims that
Article XXIV has suffered a loss of credibility "as a consequence of
79. The 1994 Understanding adopted a "weighted average" of the tariff rates and of
customs duties applicable before and after the formation of the FTA or CU to evaluate whether
the restrictions imposed on external parties are more restrictive. Understanding, supra note 62,
at para. 2.
80. l at para. 3 (A "'reasonable length of time' referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article
XXIV should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases.").
81. Id at paras. 4-6.
82. Id at paras. 7-11.
83. Wechter, supra note 44, at 2620.
84. AEI Book Summary, The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements, (Jadish
Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, eds.) (Jan. 1997) <http://www.aei.org:80/bs7246.htm>.
85. Paragraph 12 of the Understanding states:
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994... may be invoked with
respect to any matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article
XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements leading to
the formation of a customs union or free-trade area.
Understanding, supra note 62, para. 12.
86. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 41, at 472.
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repeated irresolution and compromise in GATT working parties. ''s7 In
this regard, Dam argues that many RTAs polarize the international
trading system if the RTA causes signficant levels of trade diversion.8
Other Article XXIV commentators contend that FTAs harm the interna-
tional economic system on the grounds that FTAs represent an erosion of
multilateral negotiation principles.89
At the same time, a strong argument attacking Article XXIV's
usefulness can be made from the opposite viewpoint, i.e. that Article
XXIV is too restrictive, instead of not restrictive enough. Since limited
preferential arrangements liberalize only a small fraction of the RTAs'
economies, allowing these preferences might involve less discrimination
against non-RTA members than CUs or FTAs, which, at least in theory,
liberalize "substantially all" the inter-RTA trade. Thus, the justification
for proscribing more limited sectoral arrangements is unclear. As Dam
points out, "[c]ertainly it is strange to state, as Article XXIV in effect
does, that discrimination is forbidden unless it is 100 percent effective."'
The weaknesses of Article XXIV's inadequate procedural rules and
the hesitation of WTO members to enforce Article XXIV's substantive
prohibitions confirm Dam's forceful conclusion questioning "the wisdom
of the flat prohibition of preferential arrangements,"9' including, as this
note argues, its prohibition of sectoral liberalization. Accordingly, the
above critique not only undermines the application of Article XXIV's
rules, it also suggests that Article XXIV should be undermined.
IV. MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
This section discusses the role of the WTO in influencing Middle
East economic policy and analyzes several possible scenarios of econom-
ic relations between the Arabs and Israelis. It concludes that the region
should establish a sectoral trade agreement (STA) that would provide
tariff preferences for certain economic sectors. This strategy can
87. DAM, supra note 40, at 291. See also John H. Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs and the
GATT, 16 THE WORLD ECON. 121, 126 (1993) [hereinafter Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs]
(arguing that Article XXIV is an inadequate tool to regulate present-day regional economic
associations).
88. Kenneth W. Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATT. The Legacy of
a Misconception, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 615, 624 (1963) [hereinafter Dam, Regional Economic
Arrangements and the GA77]. Even so, as Steinberg points out, "neither a GATT dispute
settlement panel nor the Contracting Parties have ever found trade diversion to be a suitable
basis for attacking free-trade agreements." Steinberg, supra note 41, at 346.
89. See Gardner Patterson, Implications for the GATT and the World Trading System, in
FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (Jeffrey J. Schott ed. 1989), at 353-365.
90. DAM, supra note 40, at 289.
91. Id, at 288.
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encourage needed economic development to the region while accommo-
dating manifest political and economic conditions that would prevent any
greater degree of economic integration.
A. The Role of the WTO in the Middle East
While many Middle East countries are GATT and WTO members, 9
thereby committing themselves to the principle of global free trade, there
is little enthusiasm in the region for the general free trade agenda that the
WTO encourages.93 In practice, the majority of Middle East countries
"are protectionist and are likely to stay that way for the years to come." '94
For example, Saudi Arabia has been reluctant, until recently, to accept
the authority of international bodies over any aspect of its domestic
policy.95
However, several Arab States have joined the GATT/WTO system
notwithstanding their reservations. First, GATT was accepted among
many Arab States because it was simply deemed irrelevant. Even though
GATT's rules are designed to reduce barriers and discrimination against
merchandise exports, the Arab Gulf region's primary export, hydrocar-
bons, is exempted from GATT's Article I bindings. 96 If the WTO in-
creases the global economy and growth rates as expected, Arab oil
exports would likely increase to meet the increased global energy de-
mand, thereby providing adequate foreign exchange to purchase increased
imports.97 Second, many Arab States decided to join the GATT/WTO
system because they recognize that integration into the global economy
is a necessary prerequisite for their economic development.9" Third, as
WTO members, Arab nations can exert some influence in international
trade matters; outside, they would have none.99 Many Arab countries also
92. See O'Sullivan, supra note 8.
93. Id.
94. Id. Many of the development policies pursued across the region over the past twenty
years are far from the free trade model. Fixed exchange rates, customs duties on manufactured
goods, restrictions on service suppliers, and preferential government purchasing programs
characterize many Middle Eastern trade regimes. O'Sullivan further claims that "[e]ven if the
idea of free trade has been accepted, the practical application of its principles might be highly
unpopular among politically sensitive groups across the Middle East." Id.
95. Id.
96. O'Sullivan, supra note 8.
97. Id. Although it is warned that "such gains could not'be achieved if consuming states
go ahead with plans to impose new energy taxes." Nadim Kawash, Arab Balance of Payments
Hurt By WTO, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
98. See Energy: Mid-East Arab States To Attract More Investment, INTER PRESS SERV.,
Mar. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
99. O'Sullivan, supra note 8.
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realized and appreciated the WTO's attempt to liberalize trade barriers
within their financial sectors."° Finally, the WTO could positively effect
Middle Eastern countries' government procurement policies.'"'
Thus, in order for a successful regional agreement to be accepted
across the diverse political and economic landscape of the Middle East,
it is clear that it will have to provide some concessions to the Arabs to
protect their resources and markets, yet liberalize trade to some degree to
attract investment and development that the region so badly needs. In
addition, whatever regional association is ultimately established, it must
comply with international legal commitments as embodied in the WTO.
B. Scenarios of Middle East Economic Integration
To understand why an STA would be a viable regional trade policy
in the Middle East, it is useful to discuss why other trade schemes would
not. For example, one option might be for the Arab countries to first
integrate their economies before joining Israel and other countries in a
single market.'0 During this period, the Arab States could "consolidate
democracy in their political and economic systems and revise their
policies on education, training, planning, and exploitation of resour-
ces." 10 3 Such plans would supposedly draw from previous Arab attempts
to integrate their economies as discussed supra.' 4
Another option for a regional trade policy might be to establish an
FTA in accordance with GATT Article XXIV-that is, an FTA covering
substantially all those countries' goods and services. This idea might be
feasible if Israeli-Arab trade would be balanced and not dispro-
portionately one-sided. For example, in a study conducted by the Sharjah
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the United Arab Emirates, the
Chamber argues that despite the fact that Israel "has built a relatively
large export-oriented industrial base, its exports are equivalent to less
than 10% of total Arab imports."' 5 The study also contends that strong
Israeli exports will have little impact on the Arab countries' level of
100. WTO, Press Release, Financial Services Agreement Confirmed-Statement By
Chairman, Press/19, July 28, 1995. For example, if the WTO removes restrictions on the right
of financial institutions to establish operations in Member States, this measure could have a
major impact in Middle East countries that protect their banking systems and capital markets.
101. See O'Sullivan, supra note 8.
102. Arabs-Israel-UAE Chambers Says Arabs Have Nothing to Fear From Israel in
Common Market, ARAB PRESS SERV. DIPLOMAT RECORDER, Apr. 30, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Arabs-Israel].
103. Id.
104. See supra Part Il.B.
105. Arabs-Israel, supra note 102.
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imports. l ' Thus, an argument can be made that Israeli industries pose
little threat of "dominating" the Arab economies in the near or long term
future. After all, as many economists argue, at least in theory, trade liber-
alization produces a net increase in all nations' welfare."°
However, the above models of integration are unfeasible in the
Middle East for several reasons. The first scenario, Arab integration,
would be unlikely considering that few benefits arose from prior Arab
attempts to integrate their economies as explained supra."8 Little new
evidence suggests that future attempts would fare any better.
Attacking the second scenario, a full-scale FTA, requires more
detailed analysis. One commentator warns against such a plan by point-
ing out that the time may not be ripe for such levels of economic inte-
gration "due to uncertainties about the Arab-Israel peace process, the
challenge of Islamic dissident movements and the lack of public aware-
ness of the need for change [in Arab societies]."0 9 A broader problem,
documented by Henri Barkey, is that the countries comprising the Middle
East are "unquestionably dissimilar in many respects, including levels of
development, workings of the market, integration with the world econo-
my, and systems of governance and legitimation."' 10 In addition, many
Arab countries' political and economic systems might be unfit to handle
high levels of capital investment that would occur under conditions of
free trade with Israel and the rest of the world."' For example, the
countries neighboring Israel, namely Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and
Egypt-the most likely candidates to form a Middle East regional
association if Arab-Israeli relations continue to improve--currently suffer
from low public sector production capacities, high production costs,
inadequate agricultural and industrial technologies, relatively small
private sectors, and elaborate social security systems. Moreover, attempt-
ing to establish a high degree of economic integration in the Middle East
106. See id
107. See GILPIN, supra note 7, at 172-80.
108. See supra Part II.B.
109. O'Sullivan, New Era supra note 16, at 3.
110. Henri J. Barkey, Introduction: Economic Reform in the Middle East, in THE POLITICS
OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 5 (Henri J. Barkey ed., 1992).
111. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported that Israeli central bank governor
Yaacov Frenkel said that Israel's market-oriented economy is "incompatible" with those of
regional Arab nations and dismissed visions of Mideast economic integration patterned after
European or North American trade blocs. World Wire: Israel's Economy Sticks Out, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 14, 1994, at A14.
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could have undesirable consequences because economic and social
disparities will increase adjustment costs to an "intolerable level."
' 12
Several Arab officials also warn that Israel would dominate Arab
economies due to Israel's relatively superior industries. For example, the
Sharjah study maintains that "Israel has a governmental, institutional,
legal and administrative structure that is far superior to that in all Arab
countries." 3 These concerns may be further compounded by the fact that
the Israeli economy is essentially a market-oriented capitalist economy
that is well-suited to interact with foreign markets while many Arab
countries are not.t14 In sum, one scholar warns that Israel will benefit
disproportionately more than the Arabs."
5
In addition, from a global perspective, there is some evidence sug-
gesting that an Article XXIV FTA among Israel and the Arabs would
lead to trade diversion, i.e. buying relatively expensive Middle East
products rather than buying cheaper from outside of the Middle East.1 6
Finally, as pointed out supra in the context of RTAs among LDCs,
another potential and important issue of Arab-Israeli trade is the problem
of non-complementarity." 7 For example, while Jordan's main products
are phosphates, vegetables, fruits, potash and fertilizers," 8 there is some
evidence that Jordanian exportable goods will not generate sufficient
demand in Israel." 9 Furthermore, it is alleged that the Jordanians are not
genuinely interested in trade with Israel and will raise trade barriers to
protect sensitive industries from Israel's exports."n
112. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 281.
113. Arabs-Israel, supra note 102.
114. Finding Common Economic Ground, AL AHRAM WKLY., Sept. 16, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
115. Finding Common Economic Ground, supra note 114.
116. Again, the emphasis on trade diversion has been attacked. Despite the potential
existence of trade diversion in a Middle East trade association, Harik states that "a strong case
for economic integration can be argued on other grounds. One important factor is the ex-
tremely small size of the individual markets, which constitutes a serious constraint on the
industrial development and economic growth." Harik, supra note 36, at 133. See also Paul
Wonnacott & Mark Lutz, Is There A Case For Free Trade Areas?, in FREE TRADE AREAS
AND U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 89, at 62--64 ("There are several grounds on which an
FTA may be desirable even if it is predominantly trade diverting.").
117. See supra Part II.C. In other words, Arab-Israeli trade may lack pairs of goods for
which consumption is interdependent, such as gasoline and autos, or hot dogs and mustard.
This problem has been documented with regard to intra-Arab trade as well. See Bani-Hani,
supra note 41, at 60. On the other hand, there is evidence that some economic
complementarities do exist. See infra Part III.C.
118. Interview with Professor Eliahu Kanovsky in The Economic Dividends to be Realized





Securing the Peace Dividend in the Middle East
C. Sectoral Integration
While both the Arabs and Israel might benefit from some form of a
common market in the long term, "Israel will be the first to take the
initiative and set trade conditions will also be the first to benefit from the
economic relations which will emerge in the coming era..'.. This concern
poses a serious policy issue for Middle East nations when planning the
nature of their economic relations. Expounding on the liberal view of
political economy previously discussed,' 2 it will be essential to design
and implement measures that will benefit Arabs and Israelis to such an
extent that both sides would have "vested interests" in maintaining peace-
ful relations.'23 For example, Professor Hirsch argues that Middle East
trade should be limited to transactions that satisfy this "vested interest"
criterion." u This standard is useful because it recognizes that dispropor-
tionate economic gains by either side could produce intense commercial
rivalry that could undermine the peace arrangement altogether. In order
to satisfy this standard, this note argues that the Middle East should
slowly integrate their economies by granting tariff preferences to goods
and services where the countries have complementary production struc-
tures.
1. Advantages of STAs
An STA would be attractive to many Middle East governments
because it offers many advantages over policies involving greater levels
of economic integration. First, an STA would enable them to liberalize
certain aspects of their economies while retaining some control over their
internal markets and sensitive industries. Second, it provides a framework
for the participants to assess the costs and benefits of their participation.
For example, this scheme would address the legitimate Arab concern that
Israel would reap disproportionate gains at their expense. Third, a sector-
al' approach would allow large-scale and growth-oriented industrial
121. Finding Economic Common Ground, supra note 114.
122. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
123. ARAD ET AL., supra note 7, at 47-70. See also Interview with Hani Mulki, president
of Jordan's Royal Scientific Society, quoted in Robert L. Pollock, Editorial, A Prosperous
Jordan is Good for Israel, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1997 at A18 ("Once the dividends come, ...
the people will protect the peace."); Interview with Ismail Osman, chairmain of the Arab
Contractors company, quoted in Cathy Waugh, UNIDO: Mideast Business Boosts Peace,
U.P.I., Oct. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("Once economic
interests have developed, people will want to preserve this wealth. They will be very careful
to protect their interests."). See also Lubetzky, supra note 4, at 409-10.
124. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 281.
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projects to mature throughout the region. Over time, these selected
economic sectors would become competitive enough to enter global trade
markets. Another advantage is that by "[w]orking within a sector, the
interaction of tariffs, nontariff barriers, and policy intentions for the
future could all be looked at simultaneously."'25 Finally, Arab govern-
ments may find it more politically palatable to convince their respective
domestic constituencies of the merits of limited sectoral liberalization, as
opposed to an across-the-board liberalization program that Article XXIV
requires-a trade policy that would represent a drastic shift in the Arab
government's previous economic development policies.
On the other hand, however, some analysts note that the sectoral
approach imposes heavy transaction costs due to administrative and
operational impediments such as much time consuming interfirm and
interindustry negotiation. 126 Moreover, abuses might also arise as pow-
erful domestic interest groups will undoubtedly strive to influence the
government's selection of which industries will be given preferential
status.
Regardless, the advantages created by granting sectoral preferences
outweigh the potential practical problems that might be encountered
during the process of establishing the sectoral trading regime. This
process is itself beneficial if it includes the private sector in the integra-
tion process and allows representatives of those selected sectors to ex-
change information about their production conditions. For example, by
enabling those representatives to voice their proposals to their govern-
ments and encouraging those industrial sectors to cooperate with each
other, non-tariff barriers used in a particular industry can also be ad-
dressed. Moreover, because the sectoral approach makes it easier to study
the economic developments of a particular sector as opposed to monitor-
ing their entire economies, "the potential effects of a policy chosen for a
sector can be more foreseeable and less risky than for a broader ap-
proach, where the economic impacts that may occur are much less well
understood."'
127
Members of an STA would also gain some of the benefits of eco-
nomic interdependence without the costs of a fully liberalized trading
regime. Although an STA would depart from the WTO's general
125. PIERRE LORTIE, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE LAW OF GATT 175 (1975).
126. PETER ROBSON, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 198 (3rd ed.
1987). See also GHANTUS, supra note 38, at 41.
127. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 245 (1969) [hereinafter
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE].
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emphasis on multilateralism and nondiscrimination,12 such a scheme
appears to be the only viable way to satisfy both the need for economic
development and the desire of Arab governments to maintain control
over their economic and political development. This is not to say that
protectionist trade policies should be tolerated where they are politically
popular. In principle, the assessment of preferential trade agreements
should ultimately be judged on their overall economic effects. However,
whether any increase in Middle East sectoral trade is good or bad for the
global trading system should not be determined only on the trade diver-
sion basis that Dam suggests. 9 While trade diversion is an important
criterion, "[o]ne also has to look at the momentum, or the lack of it,
these arrangements impart to multilateral negotiations, and ultimately to
the wider trade liberalization process."" In addition, the benefits of sec-
toral preferences to the Middle East region and the world trading system
would likely outweigh the costs of potential trade diversion that such a
scheme might produce. This might be true because an STA strategy,
analogous to a regionalist strategy, might achieve global free trade
objectives faster than a multilateral approach.13' For example, El-Agraa
argues that little can be done to prevent regional associations whether the
world likes it or not, and that these groupings, particularly the EU, have
nonetheless produced strong momentum towards greater liberalization
and progress towards Article XXIV compliance.
Finally, by allowing certain STAs, the WTO might have a better
chance of containing governments with different political and economic
128. "Multilateralism" embraces the view that international decisions should be made by
international agreements based on broad consensus and should bind many nations. The
underlying idea is that unilateral actions by single countries or among a small group of
countries will erode the mutual cooperation that is necessary to keep markets open and is
inequitable because only a few countries reap the benefits of a proposed action. Thus, the
multilateral philosophy is most strongly reflected in the MFN clause of GATT Article I.
129. See DAM, supra note 40, at 275, and Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and
the GATT, supra note 88.
130. John Whalley, Comments to Gardner Patterson, Implications for the GATT and the
World Trading System, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 89, at 373.
131. Some scholars think that RTAs might bring global free trade sooner by keeping up
the trade liberalizing momentum when global negotiations languish. They contend that RTAs,
because they involve fewer countries, are more flexible to address problems that would
otherwise take years to negotiate in global discussions. See The Right Direction?, THE
ECONOMIST, supra note 41, at 23.
Of course, analysts disagree whether this contention is true. Compare Marshall A. Cohen,
Regionalism's Lure: Regionalization of Trade and Investment, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, July, 1993,
at 28, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (stating that "the drive toward deeper
regional integration is unlikely to be halted."), with The Trouble With Regionalism, THE
ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 79 (arguing that most FrA's are trade diverting).
132. EI-Agraa, supra note 39, at 3 (noting that the EC established the common external
tariff at the same time that the Kennedy Round reduced tariffs).
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ideologies within the Organization's supervisory framework. This might
greatly reduce the polarization and friction between capitalist and
centrally planned States, exemplified by the current debate over Chinese
membership in the WTO.133
2. Securing Peace
Most importantly, a sectoral approach in the Middle East would
effectuate the strong political purpose of securing the continuing peace
process. As Professor Jackson states, "[pirobably the most important
foreign policy goal related to international economic policy is the pre-
vention of war." 34 The WTO should always consider this principle
foremost because economic efficiency may not be the only goal that
motivates nations to join regional arrangements, much less join the
WTO. To illustrate this idea, Professor Jackson noted that "[c]losely
allied nations may wish to cement [their] alliance through economic
integration or ... to enhance the stability and capacity of a particular
region to defend itself.1 35 Indeed, unless an RTA is successful enough to
survive politically, its potential economic success will be largely irrele-
vant.
Surely, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is one
example of what Professor Jackson had in mind.136 The strategy of using
partial economic integration as a means of producing economic develop-
ment and political security was successfully used in Western Europe after
World War II. In that case, France and West Germany overcame some of
their political and economic differences by signing the Treaty of Paris in
1951.137 This treaty established the ECSC, a free trade area in coal and
steel products among West Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and Italy.
The United States appreciated the importance of creating interdepen-
dent economic relationships to foster political cooperation as it played
133. See Ruggiero Sees "Tough ime" Ahead in China- WTO Debate, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Apr. 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
134. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 41, at 37.
135. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 127, at 580.
136. See Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs, supra note 87, at 122 (citing the ECSC as an
example where political motivations superceded economic considerations when forming a
regional association).
137. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140. According to Professor Jackson, "[tlhe Treaty expires in 2001 and it is expected
that coal and steel products will then become subject to the EC Treaty." JACKSON ET AL.,
supra note 41, at 187, fn. 2.
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an important role in the formation of the post-war European economy
based on cooperation and fewer intra-European economic barriers. As
Gilpin points out, "[o]f equal importance, however, was the American
provision of a sense of security, not just against the Soviet Union but
also with respect to the risks inherent in dismantling protectionism and
with respect to the latent fear of German domination, especially on the
part of the French."'
138
While the primary purpose of a Middle East trade association would
be to foster peaceful relations and not to coordinate a common Middle
East defense policy, the historical similarities between the formation of
the ECSC and the current developments in the Middle East are striking.
Just as France was concerned about an industrially superior West Ger-
many as a result of the economic aid West Germany was receiving from
the United States,139 the Arabs also fear that Israel will dispro-
portionately benefit if there is closer economic interaction" in part
because of the massive political and economic aid Israel has enjoyed
from the United States. Moreover, in both situations, formerly warring
nations attempt to solidify their political reconciliation by creating
mutually vested economic interests in specific industrial sectors. After
all, the ECSC was intended, inter alia, to prevent the reemergence of
prewar rivalries. This was undoubtedly a subtle, but crucial, factor that
GATT members considered when deciding to tolerate the limited prod-
uct scheme of the ECSC.'
41
Similarly, developed countries have a strong interest in fostering
both industrial development and political reconciliation in the Middle
East. 42 An appropriate way for developed countries to show their sup-
port would be to allow those peace-declaring countries to integrate their
economies on a sectoral basis even if it does not offer the rest of the
138. ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 107 (1975)
[hereinafter GILPIN, U.S. POWER].
139. ARAD ET AL., supra note 7, at 126.
140. See supra Parts H.C and 1V.B.
141. The ECSC was technically granted a waiver of GAT obligations under Article
XXV, paragraph 5. See V.A. SEYID MUHAMMAD, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WORLD TRADE
252 (1958).
142. See Lubetzky, supra note 4, at 407 (discussing the U.S. interest in "keeping the
Middle East safe"); Waugh, supra note 123 (explaining how "[t]ighter economic ties and
increased investment in the Middle East would greatly boost the peace process."); China
Reaffirms Support for Mideast Peace Process, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 29, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (China will "continue its economic cooperation
with and provide assistance to countries in the region.").
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WTO members any immediate economic advantages.'43 After all, as
Gilpin points out, the United States reversed its earlier commitment to
global multilateralism and nondiscrimination by promoting the ECSC's
preference area which, in the short term, discriminated against American
goods. Gilpin explains that "[a]lthough the U.S. tolerated discrimination,
it also assumed that a fast-growing Europe would eventually be more
trade-creating than trade-diverting."" Similarly, strong economic growth
in the Middle East might foster viable industries that would allow those
countries to competitively enter world trade markets, thereby integrating
those countries within the region and with the rest of the world, expand-
ing global trade. As the European experience demonstrates, sectoral
integration provides a strong impetus for deeper levels of economic
integration, such as a more expansive FTA.
3. Potential Sectors
To be precise, an economically beneficial sectoral agreement in the
Middle East would provide tariff preferences for upstream and down-
stream inputs or resources used in the production process. For example,
in the context of a textile agreement between Egypt and Israel, Hirsch
explains that since Egypt has an obvious advantage in labor-intensive
operations such as sewing, Israeli and Egyptian firms could cooperate
either by subcontracting or by establishing joint ventures. Egyptian firms
could take advantage of Israel's capabilities in design, printing, dyeing,
and finishing. More importantly, geographic proximity facilitates com-
munication and physical shipment of goods on short notice and at low
cost. 45
In their 1983 analysis of the Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement, Profes-
sors Arad, Hirsch and Tovias, as well as Hirsch in a separate work,
highlighted the textile and clothing sector as an example of an industry
with potential complementarities between Israel and Egypt.
146
143. See Jurgen Huber, The Practice of GATT in Examining Regional Arrangments
Under Article XXIV, 19 J. COMMON MKT. STUD., 281, 295 (1981).
144. GILPIN, U.S. POWER, supra note 138, at 108.
145. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 278.
146. ARuAD ET AL., supra note 7, at 128-132; Hirsch, supra note 1, at 278. The Israeli
clothing industry maintains a strong export performance in Western Europe and to some
extent in the United States, through the establishment of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement
in 1985. Il
For the purposes of this note, it is not important to correctly identify the potential sectors
for a regional sectoral arrangement and analyze the relative viability of each. Rather, the point
here is that such an approach is a worthwhile strategy.
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Complementarities also exist between Egypt and Israel in the chemical
industry, 147 as well as among the Arab States as a whole.148 Bassam
Harik identified soaps, plastic, rubber, synthetics, cement, iron and steel,
and aluminum as potential sectors among selected Arab States.,49 In
addition, part of a viable integration strategy might also include coopera-
tion agreements in energy, and transportation-areas which continue to
be developed at this time.150
V. AMENDING ARTICLE XXIV
The policy arguments advanced above regarding the benefits of a
sectoral trade strategy underscore the need for the world trading system
to address the legality of STAs. As discussed earlier, RTAs purporting
to grant tariff preferences to a limited selection of industrial sectors
facially violate GATT Article XXIV. In view of the above analysis,
however, this note argues that Article XXIV should be amended to
allow sectoral preferences in free trade areas under limited circumstanc-
es. Such an approach represents a realistic and practical compromise for
the Arabs and Israelis. This approach is realistic because many analysts
contend that a "legal" CU or FTA is unlikely to be formed in the Mid-
dle East.'5 ' In addition, it is increasingly apparent that a system of
147. HAIM BEN-SHAHAR ET AL., ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE
193-94 (1989) ("Egypt's lack of potash and Israel's lack of domestic resources for the
production of nitrogen.... If Egypt and Israel would pool their resources, the Israeli fertilizer
industry might help Egypt to sell in the difficult but profitable markets of the Americas,
Western Europe and Japan, in which Israel has developed a marketing network... . The
diversification of market potential might possibly yield the two countries an estimated extra
revenue of 1 percent.") Hirsch also showed that:
[i]n the fertilizer industry, cooperation between Egypt and Israel can, at a mini-
mum, entail bilateral supply arrangements covering missing ingredients: potash
from Israel to Egypt and ammonia from Egypt to Israel. More ambitious schemes
might consist of long-range supply contracts which may justify expansion of
production capacity of ammonia in Egypt and potash in Israel, and of plants using
these materials in both countries.
Hirsch, supra note 1, at 278.
148. GHANTUS, supra note 38, at 174-210.
149. Harik, supra note 36, at 92-118.
150. See Elaine R. Fletcher, Israeli, Jordanian Firms Making Trade lies; Newfound
Unity to Benefit Industries, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 22, 1994, at A8.
151. See Hirsch, supra note 1, at 281 ("even mild forms of integration such as a free
trade area cannot be contemplated for the time-being"). Though she was referring to the
aftermath of the Israel-Egypt peace agreement, Arad similarly claims that "[tihere is little
doubt that at least in the near future these relations are going to be dominated by political
considerations." ARAD ET AL., supra note 7, at 117. See also Bani-Hani, supra note 41
(arguing that "present political and economic differences among the Arab states ... makes
[the goal of complete Arab economic unification] difficult to achieve, at least for the foresee-
able future. Instead, "a gradual and regulated program of economic integration appears to be
more feasible at the present time and may pave the way for complete economic unification.").
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sectoral cooperation is most likely to emerge, based on the fact that such
relationships are already being established and will likely continue to be
negotiated. At the same time, however, international legal issues arise
because GATT forbids sectoral preferences.
In this part, section A concedes that this problem might be resolved
by remedies other than amending GATT, but it nevertheless concludes
that these alternative options would be inadequate. Section B suggests




At the outset, it should be recognized that the problem at hand
might be legally resolved without amending the GATT. Under the
"exceptional circumstance" clause of Article XXV paragraph 5, or the
"not fully comply" clause of Article XXIV, paragraph 10, the Contract-
ing Parties' may suspend WTO members' obligations by issuing a
formal waiver of specific GATT obligations.'53 These provisions have
been used to authorize several regional trade agreements, including the
ECSC in 1952.-54 The ECSC could not qualify as a CU or FTA primar-
ily because the duties and restrictions abolished among the participating
countries applied only to coal and steel. This violates Article XXIV's
requirement that a CU and FTA abolish "substantially all" duties and
restrictions. Moreover, the ECSC did not establish common tariffs with
respect to third countries. However, legal cover was provided under
GATT Article XXV paragraph 5, which treated the ECSC as an
"exceptional circumstance" and the Contracting Parties accordingly
152. In GATT/WTO style, "contracting parties" is capitalized when referring to the
members of GATT/WTO when they are acting jointly under Article XXV. GATT, art. XXV,
para. 1.
153. Professor Jackson labeled Article XXV, paragraph 5 as "[p]erhaps the most
important single power of the CONTRACTING PARTIES .. ." JACKSON, WORLD TRADE,
supra note 127, at 541. The text of Article XXV, paragraph 5 reads:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party
by this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be approved by a two-
thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than
half of the contracting parties. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may also by such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other voting
requirements shall apply for the waiver of obligations, and (ii) prescribe such
criteria as may be necessary for the application of this paragraph.
GATT, art. XXV, para. 5.
154. MUHAMMAD, supra note 141, at 252.
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granted a waiver of the ECSC members' GATT Article I MFN obliga-
tions. The principle contained in Article XXIV paragraph 4, which
advocates the use of voluntary economic integration to increase freedom
of trade, provided the justification for this waiver.'
5
Other examples where waivers have been granted to RTAs under
Article XXV, paragraph 5 include the U.S.-Canada Automotive Products
Agreement,156 the Benelux Association, 157 the EU's Lomd Convention
158
and the FTA between Nicaragua and El Salvador.
59
Requesting a waiver, however, is an inadequate solution to the
emerging situation in the Middle East for several reasons. First, there is
no guarantee that the Middle East situation would qualify as an "excep-
tional circumstance" as required under Article XXV, paragraph 5. The
"exceptional circumstance" criterion for granting waivers continually
proves to be vague and unpredictable as manifested by inconsistent and
unreconciled decisions by GATT's working parties' 60 For example,
there has been no attempt to formulate a definition of an "exceptional
circumstance," and as a matter of practice, a waiver will be granted
simply when a GATT contracting party secures the required number of
votes.16' To some degree, this behavior indicates that the decision to
grant waivers is largely discretionary and is often times heavily influ-
enced by the more politically and economically influential developed
countries.
Second, GATT working parties are generally reluctant to grant
waivers because of the fear that doing so would:
[s]et a serious precedent which could then be invoked by any con-
tracting party. It could also encourage pressure from non-GATT
countries for similar arrangements in connexion with bilateral
trading agreements. Furthermore, it would constitute a serious




156. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 68, at 19.
157. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 68, at 19.
158. See ACP-EEC Convention of Lomd, Feb. 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 595.
159. The waiver in the Nicaragua-El Salvador FTA was granted because El Salvador was
not a GATT member. MUHAMMAD, supra note 141, at 251.
160. See Janet McDonald, Greening the GATE: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environ-
mental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397, 464 (1993).
161. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 127, at 544. Jackson points out, though,
that "a GATT Working Party suggested that it is appropriate in each case to consider whether
the object sought through a waiver is consistent with the objectives of the General Agree-
ment." Id. (citation to the Working Party report omitted).
162. Greece-Preferential Tariff Quotas to the USSR: Unpublished GATI" Panel Report,
U/3447-185/179, 1970 GA'ITPD LEXIS 3, at para. 11, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
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This concern often proves to be of the "utmost importance."' 6' Third,
the waiver provision stipulates that "the Contracting Parties may waive
an obligation imposed upon a contracting party" which would make it
inappropriate to grant a general waiver to all the members of an RTA
such as the Middle East.' " In addition, the broad and flexible authority
of the waiver provision has led many Contracting Parties to view its
application with concern and apprehension due to its potential use as a
de facto amendment power to the GATT.16 5 Furthermore, past working
parties have considered, if not required, adverse economic conditions
such as an unfavorable balance-of-payments situation to justify granting
a waiver.66 If this is the case, then it is doubtful whether the Middle
East would qualify, because its balance-of-payments situation is not so
dire.
67
Assuming arguendo that a waiver were granted, it could have only
"limited duration"' 6 and would be subject to annual review by the WTO
Ministerial Conference. 69 It is evident, however, that an STA, as proposed
in this note, might require several years of implementation alone, and
several more years for its desired benefits to take effect. Additionally, as
Professor McDonald points out, "even if a waiver is granted, the Contract-
ing Parties may direct the party receiving the waiver to compensate other
GTTWTO File (denying Greece's application for an Article XXV waiver with regard to its
1969 Special Protocol with the USSR which provided for special tariff treatment of certain
products imported from the USSR within specific quota limits).
163. Id. at para. 13.
164. GATT, article XXV, para. 5 (emphasis added).
165. See Douglas J. Caldwell, Note, International Environmental Agreements and the
GATT: An Analsysis of the Potential Conflict and the Role of a GATT "Waiver" Resolution,
18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 173, 190 (1994).
166. See Greece-Preferential Tariff Quotas to the USSR, supra note 162, at para. 15.
GATT working parties have instead recommended that the countries extend tariff concessions
on an MFN basis as a substitute to granting a waiver of obligations. See id. at para. 13.
167. The Economist recently reported that although Israel's trade balance showed a
$10.2 billion deficit and a current account deficit of $2.6 billion in the third quarter of 1995,
its GDP and industrial production have grown 7.9% (1995 third quarter) and 10.5% (May,
1995) respectively. Moreover, Israel holds $8.2 billion in foreign reserves, up 6.8% from
1995. Emerging Market Indicators, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 112.
The Arabs' balance-of-payments situation is unclear. Some reports indicate that Gulf
States have recently experienced a decline in their payments deficit, Higher Oil Prices Ease
Gulf Payments Deficit, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File, while other reports suggest that many Arab States still face serious
economic problems, Arab Economies Seen Disappointing Despite Reforms, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, June 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
168. Greece-Preferential Tariff Quotas to the USSR, supra note 162, at para. 15.
169. WTO, supra note 8, Article IX, para. 4. Under the WTO Agreement, waivers are now
generally meant to apply for one year, and may be extended upon continuous evidence of
"exceptional circumstances." Id.
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parties who are adversely affected by it."' 70 This would, of course, defeat
the purpose of such a scheme in the first place. Finally, pursuing a waiver
is objectionable on the ground that it would subject the future of Middle
East peace and economic development to the mercy of the free trade
regime-a consideration that many Arab countries would most assuredly
find unacceptable in view of their historical reliance on state-centered
development strategies.
2. The Enabling Clause
The Middle East situation might also be resolved under the guise of
the so-called "Enabling Clause."' 7 ' During the Tokyo Round negotiations
in 1979, GATT members legalized the extension of preferences by devel-
oped GATT members to developing countries, and also provided a safe
harbor for certain kinds of trade arrangements between developing
countries."r However, the clause states that such arrangements should
aim to facilitate trade, should not create obstacles to the trade of third
countries, and should not impede MFN-based trade liberalization. 73
Consequently, trade concessions such as the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) are covered, 174 and RTAs among LDCs are thus
subject to somewhat lesser constraints under the Enabling Clause than
RTAs among developed countries under Article XXIV' 75 For example,
170. McDonald, supra 160, at 464.
171. Formally entitled, Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment,
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at
203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause].
172. Id. at paras. 1-2. Specifically, the clause includes a number of provisions that permit
GAT's contracting parties to grant "differential and more favourable treatment" to "develop-
ing" countries notwithstanding the MFN requirement of Article I. Id. See generally Abdulqawi
A. Yusuf, Differential and More Favorable Treatment: The GATT Enabling Clause, 14 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 488 (1980) (summarizing the effect of the Enabling Clause on GATT).
Yusef argued that "the principal of differential treatment is based on the idea that equal
treatment of unequals is unjust and that the same rules can therefore not apply to countries at
different stages of development." Id. at 492.
173. Enabling Clause, supra note 171, at para. 3.
174. The GSP allows, but does not require, developed countries to grant duty-free
treatment or other non-reciprocal tariff preferences to products originating from developing
countries for a trial period of ten years. Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Generalised System of Preferences, Decision of June 25, 1971, B.I.S.D.
(18th Supp.) at 25 (1972). The GSP is intended to compensate for the developing countries'
competitive disadvantages and to facilitate their industrialzation. According to Bartram Brown,
"[w]hile most of the industrialized countries have established GSP preference schemes since
1971, each country's scheme is different, and many are quite complicated." Bartram S. Brown,
Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 362 (1994)
(footnote omitted).
175. With regard to preferences among developing countries, the Enabling Clause states
that:
Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting
parties for the mutual reduction of elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with
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the clause applies only to tariffs, although "the preferential removal of
nontariff barriers still requires Article XXIV coverage or a waiver.'
' 76
In practice, the Enabling Clause has proved to be a continuing source
of legal confusion among GATT Members. On one hand, as Low points
out, the Enabling Clause states that industrial countries do not expect to
receive reciprocal commitments from developing countries that are
inconsistent with the latter's individual development, financial and trade
needs.' 77 Yet on the other hand, the clause also states that developing
countries expect to participate more fully in the GATT framework as
their development and trade situations improves.
Confusion also derives from the fact that the Enabling Clause does
not contain any reference to Article XXIV. This omission makes it
unclear whether the clause applies in situations where Article XXIV does
not, whether the clause affects the terms of Article XXIV's application,
or whether it provides LDCs with an alternative to Article XXIV alto-
gether. Indeed, opinion differs as to whether the Enabling Clause pro-
vides a sufficient legal basis for all regional agreements among develop-
ing countries or whether it was not intended to cover arrangements that,
up to 1979, would have been handled exclusively under Article XXIV.
7 s
Until these crucial issues are resolved, applying the Enabling Clause
to a Middle East common market is legally tenuous. First, it is unclear
whether the "substantially all" requirement under Article XXIV, para-
graph 8 would apply to a future Middle East trade agreement should one
arise. Second, it is unclear whether the Middle East nations would count
as qualified parties under a literal reading of the Enabling Clause because
it is uncertain which development categories the countries would fall
into. For example, would Israel be considered a "less-developed," "devel-
oped," or "developing" country? This determination would greatly affect
whether or not Israel would legally be able to grant "differential and
more favourable treatment" to its Arab peace agreement partners.
179
Finally, while it is true that GATT Contracting Parties have historically
"maintain[ed] a higher degree of tolerance" towards developing
criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the Contracting Parties, for the
mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures or products imported from
one another.
Enabling Clause, para. 2(c).
176. Low, supra note 62, at 150. Eleven RTAs have invoked the Enabling Clause as legal
cover for their agreements. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 68, at 88-89.
177. Low, supra note 62, at 151.
178. Id.
179. The United States articulated a similar concern regarding the application of the
Enabling Clause to Mercosur. See Francis Williams, GATT Row Brews on Mercosur Scrutiny,
FIN. TIMES, July 14, 1992.
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countries' RTAs,'8° the same might not be true in the future with the
promulgation of the WTO's Understanding on Article XXIV. Thus, a
new and more precise legal cover should be explicitly provided to a
Middle East RTA.
B. Amending the GA7T
This note argues that amending the GATT to allow sectoral prefer-
ences is a more legally acceptable solution. Such an amendment would
recognize that Article XXIV is simply unresponsive to both the global
economic interest as well as facilitating the Middle East peace process.
Because Arab States have historically resisted integrating their economies
into the world economy and are likely to resist such initiatives in the
future, 18 an across-the-board tariff reduction is an unrealistic strategy for
their economic and political development. Even if the Arabs decided to
radically liberalize their trading regulation towards Israel, it would
certainly not be likely to occur within the suggested ten year period that
GATT now permits regional blocs to fulfill their Article XXIV require-
ments. 182
Even though this note is written primarily as a policy analysis with
its primary goal to persuade WTO members to formally permit sectoral
preferences in FTAs, it is nevertheless useful to briefly outline what such
an amendment might look like. Despite the inherent difficulty of amend-
ing the GATT, this note proposes adding a paragraph to Article XXIV
that would provide legal cover for sectoral trade schemes among nations
that fulfill certain narrow criteria.
First, this new paragraph would apply to sectoral trade agreements
only among less and least developed countries, nations that have histor-
ically exercised State control over their national economies, and nations
that have been at war, or otherwise economically detached. The sectoral
preference safe-harbor would not apply to developed countries unless
they wish to establish economic relations with LDCs with which they
have been at war or have been economically detached. This requirement
reflects the purposes of several international legal instruments discussed
througout this note: the Enabling Clause's purpose to assist LDCs in
their development, as well as the strong peace-promoting function of
180. See Wechter, supra note 44, at 2619.
181. See Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, Arab World Likely to Miss Train to Global
Economy, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 19, 1995, at 53A, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
182. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
183. Under GAIT Article XXX, amendments to the GAIT require the unanimous consent
of the contracting parties if applied to Article I. In addition, such amendments are effective
only with respect to those contracting parties accepting it. GATT, art. XXX, para. 2.
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international trade agreements as embodied in the ECSC and the WTO.
For example, possible beneficiaries of this paragraph might someday in-
clude, in addition to the Arabs and Israelis, North Korea and South
Korea, Iran and Iraq, and Pakistan and India.
Second, the countries forming an STA would be required to cut their
internal tariffs to the lowest level of any member within those specific
sectors. This would achieve a sensible and realistic development strategy,
while guaranteeing at least some external liberalization within that sector.
Third, STA countries would also be required to notify the WTO
before signing any sectoral agreement. Notification will enable working
parties to deliberate and review the agreement before it is initialed,
thereby ensuring an opportunity to suggest changes to the agreement, if
necessary. For example, a working party could suggest measures that
would reduce foreseeable trade diversion and encourage the STA to
adopt liberal accession clauses, such as those used by NAFTA. 184 Also,
working parties could monitor the STA every few years to evaluate the
extent of trade diversion, as well as the progress of economic develop-
ment within the member countries, and, where applicable, their progress
in securing peaceful relations. However, with respect to the trade diver-
sion issue, the working party should consider whether the trade diversion,
if any, is justified by legitimate political or economic purposes, or is
reasonable under all the circumstances, and whether it is no more restric-
tive than necessary. 8 '
Fourth, STAs would eventually have to be open-ended to allow other
similarly situated countries to join the arrangement as soon as they are
able to assume the level of obligations observed by existing member
countries. For instance, countries that are not members of a future
Middle East STA might later request that the association reduce the
tariffs on those products whose export into the association would other-
wise be displaced. This approach would encourage multilateral market-
access negotiations with the Middle East STA, thereby progressively
integrating the association with the rest of the world in the long term.
Little, if any, academic literature currently advocates a similar
proposal. Most Article XXIV commentators acknowledge the Article's
shortcomings, but instead propose that stricter review mechanisms,
discipline, and supervision would be adequate solutions.' 86 However, this
184. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 14, 1992, art. 2204, 32 I.L.M. 605.
185. This test is adapted from the GATT's jurisprudence in the environmental context.
See Robert L. McGeorge, The Pollution Haven Problem in International Law: Can the
International Community Harmonize Liberal Trade, Environmental and Economic Development
Policies?, 12 WIs. INT'L L.J. 277, 343 (1994) ("[trade restraints must be no more restrictive
than necessary to accomplish the environmental objectives.") (footnote omitted).
186. See Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs, supra note 87, at 129-30.
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note is skeptical as to whether these efforts would seriously improve
Article XXIV's effectiveness in simultaneously promoting regional free
trade while minimizing inefficient trade diversion. Furthermore, the
desire of so many countries to join illegal RTAs seems to indicate a
stubborn collective action problem for which the WTO appears to lack
enough political influence to solve at the present time. What makes
matters worse for improving Article XXIV is that the nation least willing
to change Article XXIV will ultimately determine the pace of any future
negotiations. 1
8 7
Accordingly, this note suggests that adding a sectoral trade provision
to Article XXIV would create mutually beneficial arrangements which
would likely serve as a precursor to more general free trade agree-
ments-a process that increases global economic efficiency in the long
term.
CONCLUSION
This note addresses a potentially compelling legal problem: the issue
of securing political and economic development in the Middle East with
the aid of the multilateral trading system. On one hand, an STA would
best secure the Middle East peace process because it will likely lead to
mutually beneficial economic growth which will create vested interests
in continued political and economic cooperation. On the other hand, such
a scheme would facially violate GATT's regional trade area rules. Thus,
as a middle road, this note argues that the GATT should allow such
limited product schemes for countries meeting certain requirements.
Article XXIV, in its current form, might work against promoting
peace in some of the most intractably war-stricken regions of the world.
Amending Article XXIV could solve this problem because sectoral
arrangements can serve as a means to achieve "eventually all" free trade
among those countries in the long term, provided those members even-
tually phase-in lower barriers against imports from other countries and
that they remain open to all similarly situated countries willing to join on
the same terms.'
The limitation of the sectoral strategy model is primarily a practical
one: it requires extensive multilateral action for its implementation, and
it may be difficult to build the necessary consensus to select the indus-
tries that will receive preferential treatment. Nevertheless, while the
sectoral approach might pose trade diversion problems, it represents a
sensible and realistic policy to build a lasting and meaningful peace in
the Middle East. Surely, this factor is vital to the future political and
187. See Wonnacott & Lutz, supra note 116, at 66-67.
188. Battle Lines, supra note 41, at 13.
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economic security of the region and the rest of the world. In addition,
this note argues that denying nations the right to form preferential
associations, particularly when the motivation behind their creation is
often political rather than economic, does not serve the best interests of
the world trading system.
The proposed amendment to allow sectoral preferences under certain
conditions would not significantly affect the prestige of the WTO as the
rule of law and as the forum for multilateralism in international econom-
ic relations. To the contrary, such a limited amendment should be viewed
as a better method to achieve global free trade in the long term. So long
as economic growth and peaceful relations are maintained, Middle East
nations would eventually have good reason to integrate with the rest of
the world. While sectoralism and regionalism pose some risks on the
global multilateral system that the WTO espouses, on balance they are
constructive tools to promote democratic institutions, market-oriented
economies, and most importantly, to prevent regional wars. The WTO
should provide the institutional surveillance, leadership and political
support needed to accomplish these goals.
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